

**Plato, *The Apologia of Socrates*<sup>1</sup>**

**Literally translated by Robert Zaslavsky<sup>2</sup>**

How you, oh Athenian men, have been affected by my accusers, I have not envisioned; and therefore, I, even myself, through them almost lost sight of myself, so persuasively did they speak. And yet they have said, so to speak, nothing true. And especially I wondered at one of the many things that they falsified, [namely] this [one] in which they spoke how it is useful for you to take care lest you be deceived by me as if I were formidable at speaking. For their not being ashamed that immediately they will be refuted by me in deed, when I do not appear in any waysoever formidable at speaking, this seemed to me to be their most shameless thing, unless then these [persons] call formidable at speaking one who speaks the true; for if they speak this, *I* would agree to being an orator [but] not on the same level as they. Therefore, as I speak, they have spoken either something [little] or no true thing, and you will hear from me all the truth—yet not by Zeus, oh Athenian men, [will you hear] speeches beautified, as theirs were, nor adorned by verbs and nouns, but likely you will hear things spoken by means of the nouns that chance along—for I trust the things that I speak to be just—and let none of you opine otherwise; for surely it would not be proper, oh men, at this [i.e., my] age to come unto you fashioning speeches like a stripling. And yet too, oh Athenian men, I altogether need and beg this of you; if you hear me offering an apologia through the same speeches, through which very ones I am accustomed to speak, both in the marketplace at the tables—so that many of you have heard—and elsewhere, do not wonder and do not make a disturbance on account of this. For it holds thus. I have gone up to the hall of justice for the first time now, having come to be seventy years [old]; therefore, I am artless in, and foreign to, the manner of speaking here. Therefore, just as if, in being, I chanced to be a foreigner, you would surely acknowledge me if I spoke in that voice and manner in which I had been nurtured, and indeed even now from you I need this, as *I* opine, just thing, [namely] to let slide my manner of speaking—for perhaps it would be worse, and perhaps better—and to consider this very thing and to hold [your] mind to this, [namely] whether I speak just things or not; for that is the excellence<sup>3</sup> of a judge, and [the excellence] of an orator is to speak the true.

17a  
b  
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d  
18a

<sup>1</sup> The Greek text used is that found in Plato, *Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, and Crito*, edited with notes by John Burnet (Oxford/Clarendon, 1970, ©1924).

<sup>2</sup> The following outline of the dialogue that I have adapted from John Burnet may prove useful initially: I. Proemium, 17a1-18a6; II. Proposition, or Statement of the Case, 18a7-19a7; III. Apologia of Socrates, 19a8-28a1 [A. Against the Old Accusers, 19a8-24b2; B. Against Meletus, 24b3-28a1]; IV. Divine Mission of Socrates, 28a2-34b5; V. Peroration, or After-Speech, 34b6-35d8; VI. Satisfying Honor, or The Penalty, 35e1-38b9; VII. After the Sentence, 38c1-42a5.

<sup>3</sup> This word is sometimes translated as “virtue,” but since it is not etymologically equivalent to that Latin-derived term, I prefer uniformly translating it as “excellence.”

First, therefore, I am just [i.e., it is just for me] to offer an apologia, oh Athenian men, regarding the first false things of which I have been accused and the first accusers, and then regarding the later [false things of which I have been accused] and the later [accusers]. For many of my accusers have come to be before you anciently for many years already and speaking nothing true, whom I fear more than those around Anytus, although even these [latter] are formidable; but those are more formidable, oh men, who grabbing hold of many of you from [when you were] children both persuaded [you] and accused me of nothing more true, [such as] how there is a certain Socrates, a wise man, a thinker with respect to the things in the air and one who has sought all the things under earth and one who makes the lesser speech the stronger. Oh Athenian men, those who have spread this rumor are my formidable accusers, for those hearing [them] deem those who seek these things not to customarily believe the gods to be. The accusers, then, are many and for much time already have accused, and in addition also they spoke to you at that age at which you were most trusting, some of you being children and striplings, artlessly accusing by default since no one offered an apologia. And what is the most unspeakable thing of all, such that there is not even an envisioning and speaking of their names, unless a certain [one] chances to be a comic poet. And as many as have used envy and divisive-misrepresentation persuaded you—and also the very ones, who had been persuaded, persuaded others—these all are most perplexing; for none of them is such as to be brought up here or to be refuted, but it is compulsory artlessly, as it were, for the one offering an apologia to battle-shadows and to refute when no one is answering. Therefore, you too deem as worthy [i.e., you too grant], as I speak, that my accusers have come to be twofold, the ones having accused recently, and the others [having accused] anciently the things that I bespeak, and believe it to be obligatory for me to offer an apologia first against those; for you also earlier heard those accusing and much more [did you hear them] than those later.

So be it; indeed, oh Athenian men, I must offer an apologia and take it in hand to remove from you the divisive-misrepresentation in so little time that you have held for much time. Therefore, I would wish this to come to be so, if in any way it is better both to you and to me, [namely] for me offering an apologia also to do something more; and I believe this to be hard, and what sort it is does not altogether escape my notice. Yet let this go in whatever way is friendly to the god, and I must be persuaded by [i.e., I must obey] the law and offer an apologia.

Therefore, let us take up from the beginning what the accusation is from which the divisive-misrepresentation of me has come to be, trusting which Meletus wrote this writ against me. So be it; indeed speaking what did those divisively-misrepresent [me] who divisively-misrepresent [me]? Therefore, it is obligatory to read their affidavit as if it were that of the accusers; “Socrates does injustice and is a jack-of-all-trades seeking the things under the earth and the heavenly things and making the lesser speech stronger and teaching others these same things.” It is something suchlike; for you even yourselves have seen these things in Aristophanes’s comedy [i.e., *The Clouds*], [namely, you have seen] a certain Socrates being borne around there, both declaring [himself] to walk on air and babbling much other babble, things about which I understand nothing either

big or small. And I do not speak as one dishonoring suchlike exact-knowledge, if anyone is wise about suchlike things—I would not in any way flee however many judgments by Meletus—yet, oh Athenian men, I do not participate in these things. And again I hold out many of you as witnesses, and I deem it as worthy for you both to teach and to assert to each other [i.e.,] as many [of you] as have ever yet heard me conversing—and there are many suchlike among you—therefore, assert to each other if ever yet anyone of you has heard me conversing about suchlike things either in a little way or in a big way, and on the basis of this you will recognize that the other things about me that the many speak are also suchlike. d

For none of these things is [true], not even if you have heard someone [saying] how I take it in hand to educate humans and [how] I act for money, not even this is true. Although this too seems to me to be beautiful, [namely] if someone could be such as to educate humans, as Gorgias of Leontini and Prodicus of Ceos and Hippias of Elis [do]. For each of them, oh men, is such as to go into each of the cities [to persuade] the young—for whom it is permissible without a fee to be together with whomever of their own citizens they may wish—they persuade these [young persons], who have left aside beings-together with them [i.e., with their own citizens], to be together with themselves [i.e., with teachers such as Gorgias and the others], giving money and envisioning themselves in addition to be grateful. Since also another man, wise, of Paros, is here, [a man] whom I sensed to be among our people; for I chanced to come upon a man who has paid more money to sophists than all others together [have paid], [namely] Kallias the [son] of Hipponicus; therefore, I asked him—for there are two sons to him—“Oh Kallias,” I said, “if your sons had come into being [as] colts or calves, we would have [a way] to grab hold of and to hire a supervisor who was going to make them both beautiful and good in the fitting excellence, with respect to which this person would be someone either from the horse-experts or from the farm-experts; and now since they are humans, whom do you have in mind to grab hold of [to be] their supervisor? Of suchlike excellence, both human and political, who has exact-knowledge? For I believe you to have considered [this] on account of your acquiring sons. Is there anyone,” I said, “or not?” “Altogether so,” he said. “And who [might it be],” I said, “and from where, and for how much does [the person] teach?” “Evenus, oh Socrates,” he said, “of Paros, five minae.” And I deemed Evenus blessed if thus truly he should have this art and teaches for a song. I therefore, even myself, would feel beautiful and exquisite if I had exact-knowledge of these [things]; but I do not have exact-knowledge, oh Athenian men. e 20a b c

Therefore, anyone of you quickly might take me up [on this]; “But, oh Socrates, what is your activity? From where have these divisive-misrepresentations come to be to you? For surely if you have not been active about anything above what others [are], then so much rumor and speech would not have come to be, if you had not been active in something of another sort than the many [are]. Therefore, speak to us what it is, so that we may not make something up about you.” The one who speaks these things seems to me to speak just things, and I will attempt to show forth to you what ever is this that has made for me both the name and the divisive-misrepresentation. Indeed hear. And equally I will seem to some of you to kid around; yet know well, to you all the truth will I say. For, oh Athenian men, on account of nothing other than some d

wisdom, I have had this name. Indeed what sort is this wisdom? The very one that is equally human wisdom; for, by what is, I run the risk of being wise in this. And quickly these [sophists], whom I recently bespoke, might be wise in some [wisdom] bigger than the wisdom in accordance with a human, or I do not have what I bespeak; for indeed I do not have exact-knowledge of it, but whoever says [that I do] both falsifies and speaks toward a divisive-misrepresentation of me. And, oh Athenian men, do not make a disturbance at me, not even if I seem to you to speak something big [i.e., to boast/exaggerate]; for I will not say my speech [when I speak the speech] that I may speak, but I will refer [it] to a speaker who is usefully-worthy to you. For of my [wisdom], if indeed there is any wisdom and a certain sort [of wisdom], I will proffer to you as a witness the god in Delphi. For surely you know Chaerephon. He was my comrade from [when he was] young and comrade to the majority of you and he co-fled the same flight and came back with you. And you know what sort Chaerephon was, how intense in whatever he was engaged in. And indeed even once having gone to Delphi, he dared to consult the prophet with respect to this—and, the very thing that I speak, do not make a disturbance, oh men—for indeed he asked if anyone were wiser than I. Therefore, the Pythian answered that no one is wiser. And about these things this here brother of his will witness to you, since he [i.e., Chaerephon] has come to his end. 21a

Indeed consider on account of which things I speak these things; for I am going to teach you whence the divisive-misrepresentation has come to be to me. For having heard these things, I was enspirited [to consider] thus; “Whatever does the god speak, and what ever does [the god] riddle? for I indeed envision in myself that I am wise neither in [anything] big nor in [anything] small; therefore, what ever does he, asserting me to be wisest, speak? For surely he does not falsify; for it is not divine-right (θεῖμς) for him.” And for much time I was perplexed [with respect to] what ever he speaks; then altogether reluctantly I turned onto a certain suchlike seeking of it. I came to a certain one of those who seem to be wise, for the purpose of here, if anywhere, refuting the prophecy and making apparent to the oracle that “this one here is wiser than I, but you asserted me [to be wiser].” Therefore, inspecting this [person]—for I need in no way to speak [him] by name, but he was a certain one of the political-experts with regard to whom, oh Athenian men, inspecting and conversing with him, I was affected by something suchlike—this man seemed to me, on the one hand, to seem to be wise both to many other humans and to himself especially, but on the other hand, not to be [wise]; and then I attempted to show to him that he believed [himself] to be wise, but was not [wise]. Therefore, from this I was hated both by this one and by many of the ones present; therefore, going away, I reckoned (ἐλογιζόμην) to myself that I am wiser than this human; for neither of us runs the risk of envisioning anything beautiful and good, but this [person], who does not envision, believes [himself] to envision something, and, just as, therefore, I do not envision, neither do I believe [myself to envision]; at any rate I am likely to be wiser than this one by this same small something, that the things that I do not envision neither do I believe myself to envision. From here I went to another of those who seem to be wiser than that [person] and these same things seemed to me, and here I was hated both by that [person] and by many others. e

Therefore, after these things already I went sequentially, sensing and being

pained and fearing that I was hated, and yet it seemed to be compulsory to make the most of the [thing] of the god—therefore, inspecting the oracle what it speaks, I had to go on to all those who seem to envision something. And by the dog, oh Athenian men—for it is obligatory to speak the true to you—indeed I was affected by something suchlike; especially those who are well-reputed (εὐδοκίμοῦντες) seemed (ἔδοξάν) to me to lack but a little of being lacking most, [to me] seeking in accordance with the god, and others who seem less important [seemed to me] to be men more fitting with respect to a thoughtful disposition. Indeed it is obligatory to show off to you my wandering, as though [showing off to you] certain labors of [someone] laboring, so that the prophecy might come to be also unrefutable by me. For after the political-experts I went on to the poets, the [poets] of tragedies and the [poets] of dithyramps and the other [poets], for the purpose of here, after incriminating myself, grasping myself to be more unlearned than those. Therefore, taking up their poems that seemed to me especially to have been worked over (πεπραγματεῦσθαι) by them, I thoroughly would ask them what they spoke so that simultaneously also I might learn something from them. Therefore, I am ashamed, oh men, to speak to you the true; and yet it must be uttered. For, so to speak, almost all present, except a little, would speak better than they about the ones [i.e., the poems] that they had made. Therefore, also about the poets in little [time] again I recognized this, that they do not make by wisdom the things that they make, but by a certain nature also having-a-god-inside-them, just as the prophets and the oracle-singers, they [make the things that they make]; for on the one hand, these too speak many and beautiful things, but on the other hand, they know nothing of the things that they bespeak. The poets too appeared to me to have been affected by a certain suchlike affection, and simultaneously I sensed them, on account of [their] poetizing, to believe themselves to be the wisest humans also with respect to other things, with respect to which things they were not [wisest]. Therefore, also from there, I went away, believing [myself] to have become ahead [of them] in the very same thing in which [I had become ahead] of the political-experts too.

Therefore, coming to an end [of this], I went to the manual-artisans; for I was aware for myself that I had exact knowledge of nothing, to speak a word, and [I was aware] that I would find them to have exact knowledge of many and beautiful things. And I was not being false in this, but they had exact knowledge of things of which I did not have exact knowledge, and they were wiser than I in this way. But, oh Athenian men, the good creators (δημιουργοί) seemed to me to have the very same flaw that also the poets [had]—because of [their] beautifully working out [their] art, each considered [himself] worthy to be wisest also with respect to the other things, the biggest things—and this high-toned attitude of theirs [seemed to me] to hide that wisdom; so that I asked myself on behalf of the oracle whether I would accept [being] thus, as I am disposed, [namely] neither being wise in anything of their wisdom nor [being] unlearned [in anything of their] unlearnedness, or being disposed in both things that they have. Therefore, I answered to myself and to the oracle that it was profitable to me [to be] just as I am disposed.

From this examining, oh Athenian men, many hatreds indeed have come to be to me and [they were] the harshest and heaviest sorts, so that many divisive-misrepresentations have come to be from them, and this name is spoken, [this

name] being 'wise;' for on-each-occasion the ones who are present believe me myself to be wise in these things with respect to which I may refute another. And, oh men, by that which is, the god runs the risk of being wise, and in this oracle [the god runs the risk of] speaking this, that human wisdom is worthy of something little and of nothing. And [the god] appears to bespeak this Socrates and [appears] to have used my name, making me a paradigm, just as if he would speak, "Of you, oh humans, this one is wisest, who, just as Socrates, has recognized that he is, in truth, worthy of nothing with regard to wisdom." Therefore, still even now going about, I seek and search out in these things in accordance with the god both from townspersons and from foreigners if I believe someone to be wise; and whenever [someone] does not seem to me [to be wise], helping the god, I show that [the person] is not wise. And because of this business, leisure has not come to be to me to enact anything worthy of speech, either [anything] of the things of the city or [anything] of the things of my householders, but I am in ten-thousandfold poverty because of [my] service of the god. b

And in addition to these things the young who follow me of their own accord—those for whom especially there is leisure, [namely] the [children] of the wealthiest [persons]—are gratified to hear humans being examined, and many times they [themselves] imitate me, then they take it in hand to examine others; and then, I believe, they find much abundance of humans who believe [themselves] to envision something, but who envision little or nothing. Therefore, from there, those who are examined by them are angry at me, not at themselves, and they speak that a certain Socrates is most heinous and he corrupts the young; and whenever someone asks them, "Doing what?" and "Teaching what?", they have nothing to speak but they are ignorant, and so that they not seem to be perplexed, they speak those things [that are] at hand against all who philosophize, [namely] that "the things in midair and the things under the earth" and "they do not lawfully-believe [that] the gods [are]" and "they make the lesser speech stronger." For, I believe, they would not wish to speak the true things, in that they become clear making the claim to envision, and envisioning nothing. Therefore, since, I believe, they are ambitious [=lovers-of-honor] and intrusive and many and [since] they speak about me both intensely and persuasively, divisively-misrepresenting [me], they have filled your ears both anciently and intrusively. On the basis of these things also Meletus set himself against me and [so too did] Anytus and Lycon, Meletus being offended on behalf of the poets, and Anytus on behalf of the creators and political-experts, and Lycon on behalf of the orators; so that—[and this is] the very thing that, when I began, I spoke—I would wonder if I were such a sort as to take out of you in so little time this divisive-misrepresentation that has come to be so much. These things are to you, oh Athenian men, the true things, and with respect to you I speak neither hiding nor trimming anything either big or little. And yet I almost envision that I evoke hatred by these same things, which also is evidence that I speak true things and that the divisive-misrepresentation, the one against me, is this and the causes are these things. And whether now or later, if you seek these things, you will find [them] so. c

Therefore, about the things that my first accusers accused, let this be a sufficient apologia to you; and with regard to Meletus, the good and city-loving [person], as he asserts [himself to be], and [with regard to] the later [accusers], I d

will attempt to offer an apologia after these things. For indeed again, just as though these are other accusers, let us grasp in turn the affidavit of these. And it holds thus; it asserts Socrates to do injustice, both corrupting the young and not lawfully-believing the gods to be that the city lawfully-believes to be, and [believing] other strange divinities [to be]. Indeed the complaint is suchlike; but let us examine each one [point] of the complaint. c

For indeed it asserts me to do injustice, corrupting the young. And I, oh Athenian men, assert Meletus to do injustice, because in a serious manner he jests, easily setting up humans into a contest, making the claim that he is serious and cares about activities of which none ever yet was a concern to him; and that this holds thus I will attempt to show off also to you. And here, oh Meletus, speak to me; do you[—and I am sure that you do—]make the most of nothing other than the way in which younger [persons] will be the very best? d

I [do].

Indeed come now speak to these [judges], “Who makes them [i.e., the young] better?” For it is clear that you know, it being a concern to you. For having found out the one who corrupts, as you assert, you bring me to these [judges] and you accuse [me]; and indeed come bespeak the one who makes [the young] better, and inform these [judges] who he is.—Do you see, oh Meletus, that you are silent and you do not have [anything] to speak? And yet does it not seem to you to be shameful and a sufficient evidence of that which indeed I speak, that none [of these activities] has been a concern to you? But speak, oh good [man], “Who makes them better?”

The laws.

But I do not ask this, oh best [man], but what human, who first envisions this very thing, [namely] the laws? e

These [persons], oh Socrates, the judges.

In what sense do you speak, oh Meletus? Are they the sort to educate the young, and do they make [them] better?

Especially.

[Do] all [of them do it], or some of them [do], and some [do] not?

All.

You speak well, by Hera, and [you bespeak] much abundance of [persons] who benefit [the young]. And what indeed? Do the hearers make [them] better or not? 25a

These too.

And the counselpersons?

The counselpersons too.

But then, oh Meletus, the [persons] in the assembly, the assemblypersons, do not corrupt the younger [persons]? Or do all those too make [them] better?

Those too.

Then, as is likely, all Athenians make [them] beautiful and good, except me, and I alone corrupt [them]. Do you speak thus?

I speak these things altogether intensely.

You have recognized much misfortune for me. And answer me [this]; does it seem to you to hold thus also with respect to horses? Do the [persons] who make them better [seem] to be all humans, and is the [person] who corrupts [them only] a certain one? Or [is it] altogether contrary to this, [so that] the [person] who is the sort to make [them] better is either a certain one or altogether few, b

[namely] the horse-experts, and the many, if they are with and use horses, corrupt [them]? Does it not hold thus, oh Meletus, both about horses and all other animals (ζῴων)? Surely altogether [so], whether you and Anytus do not assert [it] or do assert [it]; for a certain happiness (εὐδαιμονία) would be much with respect to the young if only one [person] corrupts them, and the others benefit [them]. For at any rate, oh Meletus, you show off sufficiently that never yet did you think (ἐφρόντισας) of the young, and distinctly you make apparent your non-concern, in that none [of these things] has been a concern to you about which you bring me in [to the hall of justice].

c

And yet speak to us, by Zeus, oh Meletus, whether it is better to be at home among useful or vicious citizens? Sirrah, answer; for I ask nothing hard. Do not vicious [persons] work something bad on [persons] who are always nearest them, but the good something good?

Altogether so.

Therefore, is there anyone who prefers to be harmed by the [persons] who are with [one] rather than to be benefited [by them]? Answer, oh good [man], for the law also bids [you] to answer. Is there anyone who prefers to be harmed?

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Surely not.

Indeed bear [with me], do you bring me in here [i.e., into the hall of justice] as one who willingly or unwillingly corrupts the young and makes [them] more vicious?

I, willingly.

What then, oh Meletus? Are you who are at [your] age so much wiser than I who am at [my] age, so that you have recognized that the bad always work something bad on the ones especially near themselves, and the good [something] good, and I indeed have come into so much unlearnedness, so that I do not recognize even this, that if I make someone of the ones who are with [me] evil, I will run the risk of grasping something bad by him, so that I willingly do this so much bad, as you assert? With respect to these things I am not persuaded by you, oh Meletus, and I do not believe any other of humans [to be persuaded]; but either I do not corrupt, or if I corrupt, [I do so] unwillingly, so that you falsify in accordance with both. And if I corrupt unwillingly, about suchlike and unwilling flaws, there is not a law to bring [me] in here [i.e., into the hall of justice], but [only,] taking [me] in private, to teach [me] and set my mind straight; for it is clear that if I learn, I will cease what I do unwillingly. And yet you fled coming to be with me and teaching [me], and you were not willing, and you bring [me] in here [i.e., into the hall of justice], whither the law is to bring in [persons] who need punishment but not [persons who need] learning.

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26a

For at any rate, oh Athenian men, already this is clear of which I spoke, [namely] that to Meletus neither a big nor a small thing of these ever yet was a care. And yet indeed speak to us, how do you assert me to corrupt younger [persons], oh Meletus? Or is it indeed clear that, in accordance with the writ that you wrote, [you assert me to corrupt by] teaching [them] not to lawfully-believe the gods [to be] whom the city lawfully-believes [to be], and [to believe] other strange divinities [to be]? Do you not speak these things, that teaching, I corrupt?

b

Therefore, I speak these things altogether intensely.

Then, oh Meletus, by these same gods of whom now the speech is, speak still more distinctly both to me and to these men here. For I am not able to learn

c

whether you bespeak me to teach [them] to lawfully-believe certain gods [to be]—and then I myself lawfully-believe gods to be and I am not an altogether godless [person] and I do not do injustice by this—yet not the very ones [i.e., gods] that the city [believes to be] but others, and this is what you call me on, that [I believe] others [to be], or you assert me myself altogether not to lawfully-believe gods [to be] and to teach others these things.

I speak these things, how you altogether do not lawfully-believe gods [to be].

Oh wondrous Meletus, why do you speak these things? Do I then lawfully-believe neither sun nor moon to be gods, just as other humans [do]?

[No,] by Zeus, oh men judges, since he asserts the sun to be a stone, and the moon [to be] earth.

Do you believe yourself to be accusing Anaxagoras, oh friend Meletus? And do you so think down on these [persons], and do you believe them to be inexperienced (ἀπείρους) of letters, so that [they] do not envision that the books of Anaxagoras the Clazomenian teem with these speeches? And indeed do the young also learn these things from me, things with respect to which [they] who can purchase [them] from the orchestra-area for a drachma, even if that be altogether [too] much, may laugh at Socrates if he makes the claim that [these things], which are both otherwise [than what is usual] and so eccentric, are his own? But, by Zeus, [Meletus,] do I seem *thus* to you? Do I lawfully-believe not one god to be?

By Zeus, not [any god whatsoever] nor in any waysoever.

Yet you are untrustable, oh Meletus, with respect to these things, as you seem to me, even to yourself. For this [person, i.e., Meletus,] seems to me, oh Athenian men, to be altogether insolent and incorrigible, and artlessly to have written this writ by a certain insolence and incorrigibility and youthfulness. For he is like someone testing [me] as though composing an enigma, “Will the wise Socrates, then, recognize indeed that I am jesting and that I am speaking contrary to myself, or will I deceive him and the others who hear?” For this [person] appears to me himself to speak things contrary to himself in the writ, just as if he would speak, “Socrates does injustice [in] not lawfully-believing gods [to be], but [in] lawfully-believing gods [to be].” And yet this is [the speech] of someone kidding around.

Indeed consider together, oh men, in what way he appears to me to speak these things; and you answer us, oh Meletus. And you [men] remember the very thing that, in accordance with [my] beginnings, I begged you, [namely remember] not to make a disturbance at me if I make speeches in [my] accustomed manner.

Is there anyone of humans, oh Meletus, who lawfully-believes human actions to be, but does not lawfully-believe humans [to be]? Let him answer, oh men, and do not let one thing after another prompt a disturbance; is there anyone who does not lawfully-believe horses [to be], but [believes] horse-actions [to be]? Or [who] does not lawfully-believe flute-players to be, but [believes] flute-actions [to be]? There is not, oh best of men; if you do not wish to answer, let me speak for you and for these others [here]. But at least answer this thing; is there anyone who lawfully-believes divine actions to be, but does not lawfully-believe divinities [to be]?

There is not.

How obliging of you that reluctantly, when compelled by these [persons], you answered. Therefore, you assert me both to lawfully-believe and to teach divine things [to be], whether strange ones or ancient ones, so therefore, I lawfully-believe divine things [to be], in accordance with your speech, and these things also were in your affidavit in the writ. And if I lawfully-believe divine things [to be], surely there is much compulsion for me to lawfully-believe divinities [to be]; is it not so? Indeed it holds so; for I put you [down as] agreeing, since you do not answer. And do we not regard divinities [to be] either gods or children of gods? Do you assert [so] or not?

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Altogether so.

Therefore, if I regard divinities [to be], as you assert, if the divinities are certain gods, this would be what I assert you to be enigmatic and to be jesting [about], [namely] to assert me who does not regard gods [to be] in turn again to regard gods [to be], since I indeed regard divinities [to be]; and if the divinities in turn are certain bastard children of gods or from nymphs or from some others of whom indeed also they are spoken [to be certain bastard children], who among humans would regard children of gods to be, but not [regard] gods [to be]? For it would be similarly eccentric, as it were, if someone would regard children of horses or also of asses [to be], [namely] mules, but would not regard horses and asses to be. But, oh Meletus, there is not a way in which you did not write this writ, testing us with respect to these things or being perplexed with respect to what true injustice you could call me out on; and how you would persuade anyone among humans, even [one] having a small mind, how it is not of the same [person] to regard both divine things and godlike things [to be], and in turn of the same [persons to regard] neither divinities nor gods nor heroes [to be], [—for this] there is not any device.

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For, oh Athenian men, how I do not do injustice in accordance with Meletus's writ seems to me to be [in need of] not much of an apologia, but even these things are sufficient; and know well that what I spoke also in the earlier [speeches], [namely,] that there has come to be to me much hatred and on the part of many [persons], is true. And what nabs me, if indeed it does nab [me], is this, neither Meletus nor Anytus, but both the divisive-misrepresentation and the envy of the many. Indeed the things that have nabbed many and other and good men, [—these things] will, I believe, nab [me]; and there is nothing formidable [in the possibility that] it may come to a standstill at me [i.e., it is not likely to stop with me].

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Therefore, equally someone might speak; “Then are you not ashamed, oh Socrates, to have pursued such a pursuit from which you run the risk now of dying?” And in opposition to this [person] I would speak a just speech, that “You do not speak beautifully, oh human, if you believe it to be obligatory for a man whose benefit [i.e., value] is something even small to calculate (ὕπολογίζεσθαι) the risk of living or dying, but not [to be obligatory for him] to consider only that, [namely,] whenever he acts, whether he acts just things or unjust things, and [whether he acts] the deeds of a good or a bad man. For by your speech, as many of the demigods as have come to an end in Troy would be unimportant, both the others and the son of Thetis, who thought so little of the risk in comparison with abiding something shameful that, when his mother, who

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is a god, spoke to him when he was enspirited to kill Hector, [—when she spoke to him] somehow thus, as I believe; ‘Oh child, if you will satisfy the honor of your comrade Patroclus, [his] murder, and will kill Hector, you yourself will die—for surely immediately,’ she asserts, ‘after Hector, [your] destiny is ready’— [when she spoke to him somehow thus,] having heard this, he belittled the death and the risk, and having much more feared living [while] being bad and not satisfying the honor of one’s friends, he asserts, ‘Immediately may I die, if I have put justice to the doer of injustice, so that I not remain here laughed at beside the curved ships, a burden on the land.’ And you do not believe, do you, that he thought of death and of risk?!”

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For it holds thus, oh Athenian men, by truth; wherever one posts oneself, regarding [that post] to be best, or [wherever one] is posted by a ruler, it is obligatory, as it seems to me, for [the person] who remains there to run a risk, not calculating (ὕπολογιζόμενον) either death or any other thing before the shameful. Therefore, I would have been working formidable things, oh Athenian men, if when the rulers posted me, [the rulers] whom you elected to rule me, both in Potidaea and in Amphipolis and at Delium, then where they posted [me], I remained just as any other [person would], and I ran the risk of dying, and [if] when the god posted [me], as I both believed and assumed, [and when the god said that] it was obligatory for me to live philosophizing and examining myself and others, and [if] here having feared either death or any other action whatever, I should leave [my] post, surely that would be [something] formidable, and how truly then would someone justly lead me into the hall of justice, in that I do not lawfully-believe gods to be, since I am unpersuaded by [i.e., disobedient to] the prophet and fear death and believe [myself] to be wise [while] not being [so]. For surely fearing death, oh men, is nothing other than seeming to be wise [while] not being [so]; for it is to seem to envision things that [one] does not envision. For no one envisions death, not even if it chances to be the biggest of all goods for a human, and they fear [it] as though they well envision that it is the biggest of bads. And yet how is this not the most blameable unlearnedness, [namely,] the one of believing [oneself] to envision things that [one] does not envision? Oh men, by this, even here, equally do I differ from the many humans, and if indeed I should assert [myself] to be wiser than anyone by anything, it would be by this, that not envisioning sufficiently about the things in [the realm] of Hades, so also I believe [myself] not to envision [them], and I envision that doing injustice and being unpersuaded by [i.e., disobeying] the better, both god and human, are bad and shameful. Therefore, compared to the bads of which I envision that they are bads, I will never fear or flee things of which I do not envision whether they chance also to be goods; so that not even if now you let me go, because you distrust Anytus, who asserted either it not to be obligatory, to begin with, for me to come in here [i.e., into the hall of justice] or since I did come in, [who asserted the situation] not to be of such a sort as [to allow] not killing me, [he, i.e. Anytus] speaking to you that if I should flee, at once all your sons, pursuing the things that Socrates teaches, will be all-in-all corrupted,—if you would speak to me in regard to these things; “Oh Socrates, now we will not be persuaded by [i.e., obey] Anytus, but we will let you go, yet on this [condition] that [you] not ever pass time in this search nor even philosophize; and if you are caught still acting thus, you will die”—therefore, the very thing that I spoke, if on these

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[conditions] you should let me go, I would speak to you that “I salute and befriend you, oh Athenian men, but I will rather be persuaded by [i.e., obey] the god than you, and as long as I breathe and am of the sort that I am, I will not cease philosophizing and exhorting you and showing to whomever of you always I chance into, speaking the very sorts of thing that I am accustomed [to speak], that ‘Oh best of men, since I am an Athenian, from a city [that is] the biggest and most well-reputed in wisdom and strength, are you not ashamed to care for money so that there will be for you the most [of it], both about reputation (δόξης) and honor (τιμῆς), and you neither care nor think about thinking and truth and the soul so that it will be the bestest?’ And if any of you disputes [this] and asserts [himself] to care, I will not straightway let him go nor will I go away, but I will ask and examine and refute him, and if he seems to me not to have acquired excellence, and to assert [himself to have acquired it], I will blame [him] in that he makes the claim that the things most worthy are the least, and [in that he makes the claim that] the less important things are more [important]. I will do these things for whomever, both younger and older, I may chance into, both for stranger and for townsperson, and rather for townspersons, by inasmuch as you are nearer to me in race (γένει). For the god bids these things, know well, and I believe there to come to be to you no bigger good in the city than my subjection to the god. For I go around enacting nothing other than persuading both the younger and older of you to care for neither [your] bodies nor money before or so intensely as the soul, so that it [i.e., the soul] will be the best, [I] speaking that ‘Excellence does not come to be from money, but money and all the other good things for humans, both privately and publicly, [come to be] from excellence.’ Therefore, if speaking these things, I corrupt the young, these things would be harmful; and if anyone asserts me to speak other things than these, [that person] speaks nothing. In regard to these things, I would assert, “Oh Athenian men, either be persuaded by [i.e., obey] Anytus or not, and either let me go or not, since I would not do other things [than the ones that I do], not even if I am going to die many times.”

Do not make a disturbance, oh Athenian men, but abide for me by the things that I needed of you, [namely,] not making a disturbance over these things that I speak, but hearing [them]; for also, as I believe, hearing, you will be obliged. For therefore, I am going to say to you even certain other things over which equally you will shout; but in no way do this. For know well, if you kill me, since I am such a sort as I speak [myself to be], you will not harm me in a bigger way than [you harm] yourselves; for neither Meletus nor Anytus would harm me [in] anything—for they would not have the power—for I do not believe it to be divinely-right for a better man to be harmed by a worse. Yet equally he might kill [him] or drive [him] out or disenfranchise (ἀτιμώσσειεν) [him]; but equally this [person] and some other [person] believe these things to be somehow big bads, and I do not believe [so], but much more [I believe it to be a big bad] to do the things that this [person] here now does, [namely,] unjustly to take it in hand to kill a man. Therefore, now, oh Athenian men, I may lack much for offering an apologia on behalf of myself, as someone might believe, but [not] on behalf of you, so that you do not make a mistake in any way [by] having voted against me with respect to the god’s giving [of me] to you. For if you kill me, you will not easily find another such [person], who—if [one were] to speak [something] more

laughable—is set onto the city by the god just as onto a horse [that is] big and well-bred (γενναίως), and from its bigness more sluggish and needing to be wakened by some gadfly, such as indeed the god seems to me to have deposited me, [who is] such a someone, in the city, [and] waking and persuading and blaming you, each one, I cease in no way sitting down [on you] in all places for the whole day. Therefore, such another will not easily come to be to you, oh men, but if you are persuaded by [i.e., obey] me, you will spare me; and equally, quickly being offended, just as sleepers who are waked, having swatted me, being persuaded by [i.e., obeying] Anytus, you might easily kill [me], and then slumbering the rest of [your] lifetime, you might continue to your end, unless the god caring for you should send you some other. And that I chance to be of such a sort as to have been given by the god to the city, thence you would conceive (κατανοήσαίτε); for [my] having been unconcerned with all my own things and [my] enduring when my householders suffer unconcern for so many years already are not likely to be human, [if] also [at the same time I am] always acting your things, coming to each privately, just as a father or older brother persuading [you] to be concerned for excellence. And if I took away anything [for myself] from these things and [if] receiving pay, I bid these things, I would have some speech [i.e., that would explain it]; and now indeed you see even yourselves that the accusers, who so shamelessly accuse all the other things, did not become such as to be shameless [enough] to produce a witness that I ever with respect to anyone either acted for pay or asked for [pay]. For I produce, I believe, a sufficient witness that I speak true things, [namely, my] poverty.

Therefore, equally, it might seem to be eccentric that indeed privately going around, I counsel these things and am-a-busybody (πολυπραγμονῶ), and publicly going up into your multitude [i.e., the assembly], I do not dare to counsel the city. And the cause of this is that which you have many times heard from me speaking in many places, that there comes to be to me something godlike and divine, a voice, which indeed even in the writ Meletus—being a comedian—wrote. And to me this is beginning from [when I was] a child, a certain voice coming to be, which, whenever it comes to be, always turns me away from whichever thing I am going to act, and it never turns me toward [anything]. This is why it is contrary to me to act the political things, and it seems to me to be an altogether beautiful contrariness; for know well, oh Athenian men, if anciently I had taken it in hand to act political actions, I would have been destroyed anciently, and I would have benefited neither you nor myself in any way. And do not be offended by me since I am speaking the true; for there is not anyone among humans who will be saved [who] genuinely opposes either you or any other multitude and prevents many unjust and lawless things from coming to be in the city, but it is compulsory for the [person] who, by what is, battles on behalf of the just, even if [that person] is going to be saved for [only] a little time, to be private but not to be public.

And I will produce for you big evidences of these things, not speeches, but—what you honor—deeds. Indeed hear the things that have befallen me, so that you may envision that I would not submit to one [person] contrary to the just because I fear death, although not submitting, I would be destroyed. And I will say to you banal forensic things (δικανικά), [but things that are] true. For, oh Athenian men, I never yet ruled one other rule [i.e., I never held any other office]

in the city, but I was a counsellor; and our tribe, Antiochus, chanced to have the prytany [i.e., to be the presiding officers] when you counseled about judging the ten generals together, [namely,] the ones who did not take up those from the naval battle [for burial]—lawlessly, as in later time it seemed [even] to you all. Then I alone of the prytanes went contrary to you [in] doing nothing contrary to the laws, and I voted contrarily [to you]; and when the orators were ready to indict me and to lead [me] away, and when you bid and shouted, I believed it to be more obligatory for me to run the risk with the law and the just than [for me] fearing the fetter or death to come to be together with you [in] not counseling just things. And these things were when the city was still democratic; and when the oligarchy came to be, having sent for me as the fifth into the rotunda, the thirty [oligarchs] in turn ordered the bringing in of Leon the Salaminian from Salamis so that he might die, which many sorts [of orders] indeed they ordered many others [to do], since they wished to infect the most in their blames. Yet then I, not by speech but by deed, again showed that in me there is no concern whatsoever, unless one were to speak more savagely, for death, and [as for] working anything unjust or unholy, *all* of this is a concern [to me]. For that rule [i.e., the oligarchy] did not stun [me], although it was so strong, so that I worked something unjust, but when we went out from the rotunda, the four [others] went off into Salamis and brought Leon, and going away, I went homeward. And equally on account of these things I would have died, if the rule had not been overthrown quickly. And of these things there will be many witnesses for you. c

Therefore, would you believe me to have come to be so many years [old] if I had acted the public things, and [if], acting in a way worthy of a good man, I had helped the just things and, as is useful, I had made the most of this? Not much likely, oh Athenian men; for neither would any other of humans. But through all [my] lifetime, both publicly, if anywhere I acted anything, I will appear [to be] suchlike, and privately [I will appear to be] this same [person], since I have never yet made space for anyone [about] anything contrary to the just, neither to another nor to any one of these whom indeed the [persons] who divisively-misrepresent me assert to be my learners. And I never became a teacher of anyone; and if someone, younger or older, should desire to hear me speaking and enacting my own things, to no one ever did I begrudge [it], and I do not converse [for the purpose of] taking money and [I do not] not [converse for the purpose of] not taking [money], but I hold myself similarly both to a wealthy [person] and to an impoverished [one] [who wish] to ask [me anything], and [I hold myself similarly] if anyone wishes to hear things that I speak when I answer. And whether anyone [of them] becomes useful or not, I would not justly uphold the blame for these persons, of whom to none did I ever hold out any learning nor did I teach; and if anyone asserts [himself] from me ever to have learned anything or to have heard [anything] privately that all the others also did not [learn or hear], know well that [this person] does not speak true things. d

But because of what ever indeed are some gratified [by] spending much time with me? You have heard, oh Athenian men, all the truth I spoke to you; [it is] that, when they hear [me], they are gratified by the [persons] who are examined believing themselves to be wise, but not being [so]. For it is not unpleasant. And this, as I assert, has been ordered by the god to me to act both from prophecies and from sleep-images and by every manner by which ever any, even another, e

godlike portion ordered a human to act also anything whatsoever. These things, oh Athenian men, are both true and well-refuted. For if indeed I *do* corrupt some of the young and *have* corrupted others, if becoming older, some of them recognized that, when they themselves were young, I ever counseled anything bad, surely it would have been useful for them now to come up [to the hall of justice] to accuse me and satisfy their honor; and if they themselves did not wish [to do so], [it would have been useful] for some of their householders, fathers and brothers and other fitting [persons], if their householders had been affected by anything bad from me, [—it would have been useful for them] now to remember and satisfy their honor. And in all, many of them are present here, whom I see, first this Crito, of my [same] age and [my] demesperson, father of this Critobulus, then Lysanias the Sphettian [demesperson], father of this Aischines, and in addition this Antiphon the Cephisian [demesperson], father of Epigenes, then those others whose brothers have come to be [involved] in this pastime, Nicostratus the son of Theozotides, brother of Theodotus—and Theodotus has come to an end, so that he [i.e., Theodotus] could not beg him [i.e., Nicostratus] [not to come forward]—and this Paralius, the [son] of Demodocus, whose [i.e., Paralius’s] brother was Theages; and this Adeimantus, the [son] of Ariston, whose [i.e., Adeimantus’s] brother is this here Plato, and Aiantodorus, whose brother is this Apollodorus. And I have many others to bespeak to you, any one of whom it would have been useful especially for Meletus in his own speech to have produced as a witness; and if ever it escaped his notice, now let him produce [someone]—I give space [to him]—and let him speak if he has anything such [to speak]. But you will find altogether the contrary of this, oh men, [namely, you will find] all ready to help me, the one who corrupts, the one who works bads on their householders, as assert Meletus and Anytus. For the ones who themselves have been corrupted would quickly have a speech [to help me]; and the uncorruptable ones, [who are] already older men, [at least] the fitting ones of these, what other speech do they have [to account] for helping me but the correct and just one, [namely,] that they are aware that Meletus is falsifying and that I am telling the truth.

Indeed so be it, oh men; these are roughly the things that I would have [available for use in] offering an apologia and equally such other things. And quickly any of you would be vexed to recollect when oneself contested a contest even lesser than this contest and begged and supplicated the judges with many tears, [and] had brought up both his little-children and many others of his householders and friends, so that he might especially be pitied, yet none of these things will I do, even if I run the risk, as I would seem, of the ultimate risk [in] these things. Therefore, quickly someone who has conceived these things would be more self-willed with regard to me and, having been angry by these same things, [such a person] would put down the vote with anger. Indeed if any of you holds thus—for I do not deem it worthy for [any of you to be so], and therefore, *if* [any of you should be so]—I seem to me to speak likelily, speaking this, that “Oh best one, there are to me somewhere certain ones, even householders; for also [there is] this same [saying] of Homer [*Odyssey* 19. 163], neither ‘from an oak nor from a rock’ have I grown (πέφυκα) but from humans, so that there are to me both householders and sons, oh Athenian men, three

[sons], one already a stripling, and two little-children; but yet having brought none of them up here, I will beg you to vote for me.” Indeed why, therefore, will I do none of these things? Not being self-willed, oh Athenian men, nor dishonoring you, but whether I am bold with regard to death or not, [that is] another speech, and therefore, with regard to reputation (δόξαν), both for me and for you, and for the whole city, it does not seem to me to be beautiful for me to do any of these things both since I am at [my] age and since I have this name, whether, therefore, true or whether, therefore, false, but therefore, there is for Socrates [his] having been opined to differ from the many humans. Therefore, if the ones of you who seem to differ either by wisdom or by courage or by any other excellence whatsoever will be suchlike, it would be shameful; the very certain sort of [persons] whom many times I have seen whenever they are judged, [persons] who seem to be something, and who work wondrous things, as though they believe [themselves] to be going to be affected by something formidable if they will die, just as though they would be deathless were you not to kill them; who seem to me to attach shame to the city, so that any even of foreigners would assume that the ones of the Athenians who differ with respect to excellence, whom they [i.e., the Athenians] judge-superior among themselves in both the rules and the other honors, these differ in nothing from women. For, oh Athenian men, it is neither useful for you who seem also to be something in any way whatsoever, to do these things, nor, if we do [them], [is it useful] for you to turn to [them], but [it is useful for you] to show this same thing, [namely,] that much rather would you vote against the one who brings in these pitiful dramas and makes the city laughable than the one who brings calmness.

And apart from reputation (δόξης), oh men, it seems to me to be just neither to beg the judge nor [by] begging to flee away [i.e., go free], but [it is just] to teach and to persuade. For the judge does not sit for this [purpose], [namely,] for giving the just things as a gratuity, but for judging these things; and [the judge] has not sworn to gratify those whom it may seem to him [desirable to gratify], but [the judge has sworn] to judge in accordance with the laws. Is it not so that it is useful neither for us to habituate you to break [your] oath nor for you to be [so] habituated; for [then] neither of us would be pious. Therefore, oh Athenian men, do not deem it worthy for me to be obliged to act toward you suchlike things that I regard to be neither beautiful nor just nor holy, yet by Zeus [I regard that one should act] altogether otherwise [than to elicit pity], even one who is fleeing [a charge of] impiety by this Meletus. For distinctly, if by begging I should persuade and force you who have sworn, I would teach you not to regard gods to be, and artlessly offering an apologia, I would accuse myself as though I do not lawfully-believe gods [to be]. But it lacks much to hold so; for I both lawfully-believe, oh Athenian men, as none of my accusers [believes], and I turn over to you and to the god to judge about me in what way there are going to be the best things both for me and for you.

For me, oh Athenian men, many other things contribute to [my] not being vexed that you voted against me, and this thing that has come to be has come to be to me not unexpectedly, but much rather I wonder at the number of each of the [two] votes that has come to be. For I did not believe it would be by so little, but by much; and now, as is likely, if only thirty of the votes had fallen

differently, I would have fled away [i.e., been acquitted]. Therefore, as I seem to me, even now I have fled away from Meletus, and not only have I fled away, but to all this is clear, that if Anytus and Lycon had not come up [for] accusing me, even he [i.e., Meletus] would have been fined a thousand drachmas, since he did not receive a fifth part of the votes. b

And therefore, the man satisfies honor with a death [penalty] for me. So be it; and indeed how will I countersatisfy your honor, oh Athenian men? Or [is it] clear that [I will do so with my] worth? Therefore, what? What am I worthy to be affected by or to repay, I who have learned that I did not bring calmness in [my] lifetime, but I who have been unconcerned about the very things for which the many [care], [namely,] money-making and household-management and generalships and public-speakings and the other rules [i.e., offices] and associations and factions that come to be in the city, I who have regarded myself, by what is, to be more decent than to go into these things [in order to] to be saved, I did not go there where going I was going to be a benefit in nothing either to you or to myself, but I went there, as I assert, going to each privately to work well the biggest well-working, taking it in hand to persuade each of you not to be concerned either for any one of his own things earlier, until he was concerned for himself, so that he would be the best and most thoughtful, nor for the things of the city, until [he would be so] for the city itself, and to be concerned for the other things thus in accordance with the same manner—by what, therefore, being such [as I am], am I worthy to be affected? Something good, oh Athenian men, if it is obligatory to satisfy honor in accordance with [one's] worth by the truth; and these things are such a good that would be appropriate for me. What, therefore, is appropriate for a man, an impoverished one, a well-worker, who needs to lead [a life of] leisure for bidding you onward? There is not, oh Athenian men, that which is more appropriate than for such a man to be fed in the prytaneum, much more [so] than if any of you has been victorious in the Olympics with a horse or with a pair-of-horses or with a span [i.e., a four horse chariot]; for he makes you to seem to be happy, but I [make you] to be [happy], and he needs nurture [in] nothing, but I need [nurture]. e  
Therefore, if it is obligatory for me, in accordance with the just, to satisfy honor with [my] worth, let me satisfy honor with this, being fed in the prytaneum. 37a

Therefore, equally speaking to you these things also, I seem to speak in nearly the same way as about lamentation and entreating, since I am self-willed; this is not, oh Athenian men, suchlike, but rather such sort. I have been persuaded that I am willing to do injustice to not one of humans, but I do not persuade you [in] this; for we have conversed with each other for [only] a little time. Since, as I believe, if there were for you a law, as also there is for other humans, not to judge about death for only one day but for many, you would have been persuaded; and now [it is] not easy in little time to loose myself from big divisive-misrepresentations. Indeed having been persuaded to do injustice to no one, I lack much [of what it takes] for doing injustice to myself and for myself to say against myself that I am worthy of [something] bad and to satisfy honor with a certain such [bad thing] for myself. Having feared what? Or [do I fear] lest I be affected by this with which Meletus satisfies honor for me, [with respect to] which I assert [myself] not to envision either if [it is] good or if it is bad? Indeed instead of this, shall I choose among things that I well envision to be any of the things that are bad, since I satisfied honor with this? The fetter? And why is it c

obligatory for me to live in prison, being a slave to the rule that is established always [i.e., at any time], [such as now] to the eleven? But [shall I propose] money, and being fettered until I pay? But the same for me is what I just now spoke; for there is not to me money from which I shall pay. But indeed am I to satisfy honor with [a penalty] of flight [i.e., exile]? For equally you would satisfy honor with this [penalty] for me. Yet much cowardice (φιλοψυχία) would hold me, oh Athenian men, if I am so unspeakable as not to be able to reckon (λογίζεσθαι) that you who are my citizens were not of the sort to bear my pastimes and speeches, but to you they have become heavier and more invidious, so that you seek now to be released from them; and will others, then, bear them easily? It lacks much, oh Athenian men. Therefore, [if they should bear them,] lifetime would be beautiful to me, a human going out at this age, changing and being driven out to live from one city to another. For I envision well that wherever I go, the young will listen when I speak, just as [they do] here; and if I drive them away, they themselves will drive me out [by] persuading their elders [to do so]; and if I do not drive them away, their fathers and householders [will drive me out] on account of these same [persons].

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Therefore, equally someone would speak; “Being silent and bringing calmness, oh Socrates, will you not be of the sort, [as it seems] to us, to go out to live?” This indeed is of all things the hardest to persuade some of you. For even if I speak that this is to be unpersuaded by [i.e., to disobey] the god and [that] because of this it is impossible to bring calmness, you will not be persuaded by me as [i.e., on the grounds that] I am ironic; if again I speak that this also chances to be the biggest good for a human, [namely,] each day to make speeches about excellence and the other things about which you hear me conversing and examining myself and others, and the unexaminable lifetime is not livable for a human, still less will you be persuaded by me speaking these things. These things hold thus, as I assert, oh men, but [it is] not easy to persuade [with respect to them]. And simultaneously I am not habituated to deem myself worthy of anything bad. For if there were money in me, I would have satisfied honor with money, as much as I was going to pay, for I would be harmed in no way; and now there is not [money in me] unless then you prefer for me to satisfy honor with as much as I would be able to pay. And equally I would be able to pay you somehow a mina of silver; therefore, with so much let me satisfy honor.

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And this Plato, oh Athenian men, and Crito and Critobulus and Apollodorus bid me to satisfy honor with thirty minae, and themselves to guarantee [it]; therefore, let me satisfy honor with so much, and these [who are] worthy of credit will be guarantors to you of the silver.

On account of not much time, oh Athenian men, you will have a name and [be held to] blame by the ones who wish to revile the city since you have killed Socrates, a wise man—for indeed they will assert [me] to be wise, even if I am not, the ones who wish to blame you—therefore, if you had waited around for a little time, this [i.e., my death] would automatically have come to be to you; for indeed you see [my] age which is already far along [in my] lifetime and near death. And I speak this not to all of you, but to the ones who have voted death against me. And I also speak this [following] to these same [persons]. Equally, oh Athenian men, you believe that I have been captured by resourcelessness

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(ἀπορία) of such speeches by which I would have persuaded you, if I had believed that it is obligatory to do and to speak all things so as to flee the [hand of] justice. Not much. But I *have* been captured by a resourcelessness, yet not of speeches, but [rather] of boldness and of shamelessness and of being willing to speak to you such things that would have been most pleasant for you to hear—me wailing and moaning, and me doing other things and speaking many things and things unworthy of me, as I assert, which sorts of things indeed you also are habituated to hear from others. But neither then did I believe that it was obligatory, on account of the risk, to act anything [that an] unfree [person would], nor now is it a concern to me who offers an apologia thus, but much rather do I elect to die offering an apologia thus than to live [offering an apologia] in that [other] way. For neither in justice nor in war is it obligatory either for me or for anyone else to devise this, in what way [one] will flee from death [by] doing all [i.e., anything]. For also in battles, many times it becomes clear that someone might flee dying [by] both leaving his arms and turning to a supplication of those pursuing; and among each of the risks, there are many other devices so as to flee death, if someone dares to do and to speak all [i.e., anything]. But this fleeing death is not hard, oh men, but much harder is [fleeing] vice; for it [i.e., vice] runs more quickly than death. And now, since I am slow and old, I was captured by the slower one [i.e., by death], but since they are formidable and sharp, my accusers [were captured] by the quicker one, by badness. And now I go away, having been fined a judgment of death by you, but these [go away], having been fined wickedness and injustice in truth. And let me abide by [my] honorarium, and [let] these [abide by theirs]. Also it was obligatory for these things to hold somehow equally thus, and I believe them to hold in a measured way.

And indeed after this I desire to deliver an oracle to you, oh [you] who have voted against me; for also I am already here [at the time] in which especially humans deliver an oracle, [namely,] when they are going to die. For I assert, oh men who have killed me, that satisfaction of honor will be coming to you straightway after my death, [and one] much harsher, by Zeus, than the sort with respect to which you have killed me; for now you have worked this, believing [yourselves] to be released from giving an account (ἔλεγχον) of your lifetime, and much the contrary will come out for you, as I assert. The ones who refute you will be more, [the ones] whom [until] now I have held down, and [whom] you did not sense; and they will be harsher by as much as they are younger, and you will be vexed more. For if you believe [that by] having killed humans, you will hold anyone off from blaming you in that you do not live correctly, you do not think things through beautifully; for this release is neither altogether powerful nor beautiful, but that [release is] both most beautiful and easiest, not to lop off others but to prepare oneself in such a way that one will be the very best. Therefore, having prophesied these things to you who have voted against [me], I release myself.

But I would converse pleasantly with the [persons] who have voted for [me] concerning this action that has come to be, [for the period of time] in which the rulers are busy, and I am not yet come to [the point] where, having come [there], it is obligatory for me to die. But remain by me, oh men, for so much time; for nothing prevents [us] from chatting (διαμυθολογῆσαι) with each other as long as

it is [permitted]. For I am willing to show off to you, as to friends, the thing that has befallen me now, what ever one may have in mind [about it]. For, oh men judges—for if I call you judges, I would be calling correctly—something wonderful has come to be to me. For my customary prophetic thing, the divine thing, in all former time was altogether thick always and contrary over altogether small things, if I should be going to act anything not correctly. But now there has befallen me the very things that you, even yourselves, see, the same things that indeed someone might believe and [that] are lawfully-believed to be the ultimates of bads, and to me neither when I went out at dawn from home was the god's sign contrary, nor when I came up here before the hall of justice, nor when I was going to say anything anywhere in the speech. And yet in other speeches, in many places indeed, it held me back from speaking in the middle [of a speech]; and now nowhere with respect to this acting, neither in any deed nor in speech, has it been contrary in me. Therefore, what do I assume the cause to be? I will say to you; for this thing that has befallen me runs the risk of becoming a good, and there is not a way in which we assume correctly, [i.e.,] as many [of us] as believe dying to be a bad. A big evidence of this has come to be to me; for there is not a way in which my habitual sign would not have been contrary in me, if I were not going to act something good.

And let us have it in mind even in this way that there is much hope for it to be a good. For dying is one or the other of two things; for either [it is] of such a sort that the one who has died is nothing, [who] has not even any sensing of anything, or, in accordance with the things that are spoken, it chances to be a certain change and a house-moving by the soul from the place here into another place. And if indeed there is not any sensing, but [it is] the sort of sleep, as when someone who slumbers does not even see any dream, [then] death would be a wonderful gain—for, I believe, if it should be obligatory for someone who has selected this night in which thus one slept so as not even to see a dream, and who has placed alongside this night the other nights and days of one's own lifetime, [if] it should be obligatory for [one] who has considered to speak how many better and more pleasant days and nights even than this night [one] has lived in one's own lifetime, I believe, [and I do] not [bespeak] some private person, but the big king, that this person would find these easily numerable in comparison to the other days and nights—therefore, if death is suchlike, I bespeak [it to be] a gain; for also all time appears thus indeed to be no more than one night. But if in turn death is a sort of disembarking from here into another place, and [if] the things that are spoken are true, [namely,] how then all the ones who have died are there, what bigger good than this would there be, oh men judges? For if someone who has arrived into [the realm] of Hades, [and] who has been released from these who assert [themselves] to be judges,[—if that someone] will find the [ones who are] so truly judges, the very ones who also are spoken to judge there, [namely,] Minos and Rhadamanthus and Aeacus and Triptolemus and as many others of the demigods as became just in their own lifetime, then would not the disembarkation be unimportant? Or in turn, for how much would any of you accept coming to be together with Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer? For I am willing to die many times if these things are true. Since for me, even for myself, passing time there would be wonderful, when I might chance into Palamedes and Ajax the [son] of Telamon, and if any other of the ancient ones has died on account of an unjust judging,

comparing my own affections to theirs—as, I believe, it would not be unpleasant—even indeed the biggest thing [would be] to go along examining and searching out the ones there, just as [I have] the ones here, [to find out] who of them is wise and who believes [himself or herself to be wise], and is not [so]. And for how much would someone, oh men judges, accept examining the one who has led much army against Troy or [examining] Odysseus or Sisyphus or ten thousand others, [as] someone would speak, both men and women, conversing with and being with and examining whom there[—this] would be undevisable happiness? Altogether, surely not on account of this [i.e., conversing, etc.] do the ones there kill [anyone]; for with respect to other things, the ones there are happier than the ones here, and already they are deathless for the time left, if the things that are spoken [are] true.

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But also it is useful for you, oh men judges, to be of good hope with regard to death, and to think this one something through [to be] true, that there is not anything bad to a good man, either living or having come to an end, nor are the actions of this [person] unconcerned for by the gods; nor have my things now come to be automatically, but to me this is clear, that already to die and to be released from actions was better for me. On account of this also, the sign nowhere turned me away, and to those who have voted against me and to [my] accusers, I am not altogether harsh. And yet they did not vote against me and accuse [me] with respect to this thought, but believing [themselves] to harm [me]; with respect to this, [it is] worth blaming them. Yet I beg of them this much; satisfy honor with my sons, oh men, when they mature, paining them with respect to these very same things with respect to which I pained you, if they seem to you to be concerned either for money or for anything else before excellence, and if they seem to be something that they are not, blame them, just as I [blamed] you, in that they are not concerned over things for which it is obligatory [for them to be concerned], and [in that] they believe [themselves] to be something when they are worthy of nothing. And if you do these things, I, both myself and [my] sons, will have been affected by just things through you. For yet already it is the hour to go away, I to my death, and you to your lifetime; and whichever of us comes upon a better action is unclear to all except to the god.

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